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Reform, Informal Sector and Extortion 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
Informal economy involving unrecorded, unregistered, extra legal activities employs majority of 
the workforce in the developing world. Such extra legal existence of informal production is 
facilitated through extortion by agents of political forces in power. Also extortion activities 
themselves constitute an informal segment. Full scale general equilibrium consequences of such 
institutions are rarely discussed in the literature. We develop a well specified general equilibrium 
model to explore the possible consequences of reform. Economic reform may have an 
expansionary effect on the number of extortionists. Depending on capital mobility and factor 
intensity assumptions informal output and informal wage may increase.  
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1. Introduction 
Informal sector is an important ingredient of the contemporary world economy particularly in 
the developing regions as this segment occupies a formidable chunk of the unskilled labor force. 
This sector covers primarily the non-agricultural employment of unskilled labor. It accounts for 
50-80% of total employment in South Asia, 30-50% in South East Asia, 40-50% in Africa, 55% 
in Latin America and Caribbean, 24% in Southern Europe, 10% in Western Europe, 18% in 
Canada and 8% in USA (ILO, 2002)1,2. Yet, informal sector’s jobs are not considered as decent. 
The main derogatory feature of informal sector is its extra-legality or illegality since it does not 
conform to government regulations.  These units presumably do not abide by labor regulations of 
the government, and do not pay taxes. In fact a large part of it would have vanished if they had to 
confront government regulations. The paucity of legal protection makes the informal sector an 
easy pray for extortion and corruption3,4.  
Existing literature on informal sector conventionally defines informal activity as something 
which takes place underground, covers smuggling, mafia etc. (Konrad and Skaperdas, 1998). 
Informal sector is not generally assumed as a segment which provides livelihood to a sizeable 
amount of mass without doing dangerously harmful illegal activity per se. There are also a few 
papers (Johnson, Kaufmann and Zoido-Lobaton, 1998; Johnson, Kaufmann and Shleifer, 1997; 
                                                 
1
 Some other relevant and interesting information regarding percentage share of informal sector in GDP etc. can be 
found in Schneider (2004).  
 
2
 More than 70% of all employment in countries like Zambia (80.7%), Uganda (83.7%), Thailand (72.1%), Nepal 
(73.3%), Lithuania (72%), Ghana (78.5%), and Gambia (72.4%) falls in the category of informal sector (ILO, 2010). 
 
3
 It has been reported in Ethiopia that the urban informal sector of this rural country is comprised of almost one 
million people and is vastly distorted with extortion. While Morocco experiences an annual loss of $ 3.6 billion 
because of lack of transparency related extortion/corruption/bribe (Drakard, 2009). 
 
4
 In order to reduce extortion in the informal segment countries like Ghana, Senegal, Kenya etcetera have already 
attempted to facilitate and promote registration and license to informal units. This has resulted in a significant 
reduction in the degree of extortion (Fjeldstad, 2001). 
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Gerxhani, 2004; Loayza, 1996; Shneider and Enste, 2000) where it has been shown how the 
existence of bureaucratic control, corruption and higher tax rates in the formal counterpart 
induces firm to operate in the informal sector. The interface of contract theory and informal 
economy is analyzed in Quintin (2008). Quintin (2008) finds that the size of the informal sector 
has an inverse relation with contract enforcement in the formal sector.5 In another interesting 
paper Dijkstra (2006) shows how under different circumstances an economy may end up with 
good (no informal sector), bad (no formal sector) and mixed (both formal and informal sectors) 
equilibrium. However, none of these papers recognize the existence of both corruption and 
production in the informal sector itself. Nonetheless, Friedman, Johnson, Kaufman and Zoido-
Lobaton (2000) have found the existence of corruption and production both as separate activities 
within the informal sector. Their paper is a partial equilibrium one where existence of corruption 
in the informal sector is slightly touched upon while our model intends to bring in both these 
issues in a simple general equilibrium framework.  
In a very recent paper Ghosh and Robertson (2011) nicely extended the literature on property 
rights and crime by bringing in general expropriation concept into a general equilibrium factor 
endowment model of trade. They have argued why under certain factor intensity ranking trade 
liberalization may reduce expropriation. Their result crucially hinges on the factor intensity of 
expropriation activity6. Though we use similar kind of general equilibrium model, our work is 
significantly different because of the existence of informal sector which is absent in Ghosh and 
                                                 
5
  It is noteworthy to mention that by using a competitive framework Amaral and Quintin (2006) has shown why the 
most talented managers operate with more physical capital and self-select into the formal sector than managers in 
the informal units.  This analysis also emphasizes that most skilled labor work in the formal sector as long as the 
enforcement gap between formal and informal sector is ample. 
 
6
 The main driving force of Ghosh and Robertson (2011) is that if falling trade cost raises the return to the factor 
intensively used in expropriation, the potential for efficient expropriation decreases. The paper has been extended 
further to endogenize the legal services for controlling expropriation. 
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Robertson (2011). Unlike Ghosh and Robertson (2011) we consider only informal sector to be 
subject to extortion. Therefore, informal sector itself has two components: informal production 
and extortion.  
In this paper we shall define informal sector as one which does not have to pay the minimum 
wage. Several papers such as Agenor and Montiel (1997), Carruth and Oswald (1981), Beladi 
and Chao (1993), Beladi and Yabuuchi (2001), Chaudhuri (2003) etc. have used this 
interpretation of informal sector. In a recent Oxford University Press volume Marjit and Kar 
(2011) have thoroughly used the similar notion to talk about various intricacies of the informal 
sector. But they have not considered the issue that we focus here. 
Survival of informal production requires negotiation with administration as this part of the 
economy is illegal by structure. Sometimes negotiation is done by politically supported 
intermediaries, the “extortionists”. Extortionists take care of legal troubles and other hurdles for 
the informal producers. They keep the police at bay by paying bribes which in turn are extracted 
from the informal entrepreneurs, labors, capitalists etc. As we mentioned before, there is a 
substantial literature on extortion and mafia related activities such as Skaperdas (1992, 2001), 
Konrad and Skaperdas (1998) etc. Nevertheless, our work is substantially different from the 
existing literature. First, we presuppose extortion as a facilitating device for organizing 
production in the informal sector. Extortionists are facilitator in that it ‘protects’ the extra-legal 
informal segment of the economy from legal hassles, and in exchange extortionists get pecuniary 
benefit. It is, however, not pure extortion involving all segments of the society, contrary to other 
papers on extortion. Second, more significantly, we consider mobility of labor between extortion 
and informal production. Thus extortionists also have the option to work in informal production. 
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Such mobility is then embedded in a general equilibrium structure where capital mobility also 
plays an important role7. 
The story of the paper runs as follows. We assume that the economy produces three goods 
out of which two are produced in the formal sector and the rest is produced in the so-called 
informal sector. All goods are different and only formal goods are traded. Informal good is non-
traded. One commodity in the formal set up uses skilled worker as specific factor and the other 
uses unskilled labor as the same, with capital moving between them. Formal unskilled workers 
are organized but not the informal workers. This implies that only formal sector has to pay 
minimum wage. Informal unskilled workers have to face a competitive market. Therefore, 
unskilled wage in the formal and informal segments are not identical. Formal workers are likely 
to get higher administered wage than their informal counterpart because of the existence of trade 
unions that ensure the minimum wage. Furthermore, whoever does not find a job in the formal 
sector will get one in the informal sector and wage there can have a free fall. 
The model we develop is in the tradition of more recent work in trade theory on extensions of 
the basic Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson (HOS) set up drawing from an early work of Gruen and 
Corden (1970) and from later contributions of Jones and Marjit (2009), Marjit and Beladi (1999) 
etc. 
Before we indicate about the primary predictions of the paper lets us briefly mention the 
recent economic trend that is observed worldwide and provides with the much required 
motivation. Following negotiations at the WTO the entire world has moved forward towards 
                                                 
7
 In this context we need to mention that our work is related to the research area dealing with economics of 
corruption. Marcoullier and Young (1995) has developed a two sector model on graft and corruption demonstrating 
tacit political support for informal sector. But they do not model extortion in a general equilibrium framework. 
Similarly Marjit, Ghosh and Biswas (2007) brings in informal sector and corrupt bureaucrats but does not constitute 
labor mobility between various informal segments. Te framework they use also does not consider a general 
equilibrium framework. Dobson and Dobson (2012) is another important reference in this line. 
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more economic reform and higher degree of liberalization. This point needs no further 
qualification. Interestingly it is observed simultaneously that the size of the informal sector is 
also on the rise worldwide along with different economic reform policies. Heintz and Polin 
(2005) showed that the tendency had been really increasing during the late 20th centuries. 
Likewise ILO data shows the same trend in all developing regions. However, there is a moderate 
decline from 52.8% to 49.1% during early 21st century (ILO, 2012a; ILO and WIEGO, 2012). 
But this moderate decline in percentage is not good enough to restrain the absolute numbers from 
increasing by almost 23 million since 2009 (ILO, 2012b). During 2000 and 2010 in most of the 
Central and Eastern European countries incidence of informal employment has gone up with the 
only exceptions of Turkey and Kyrgyzstan (ILO, 2013). Though Latin American countries 
experience slight reduction in informal employment, there has been an upsurge in absolute 
number of people dependent on the sector. Therefore the increasing size of informality is an 
irrefutable fact. Beside this in the last 15 years we have witnessed a moderate but steady decline 
in the value of governance pointers reflecting higher corruption or corrupt practices around the 
globe. Indicators like government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, control of 
corruption are found to be decreasing over time during 1996-2012 (World Bank, 2012). Table-1 
gives us a snapshot about corruption which is directly reproduced from Worldwide Governance 
Indicators website.  
 
 
 
 
 
8 
 
Table-1 
 
The thick line shows the percentile rank on governance indicators mentioned, and thinner lines indicate margins 
of error. 
 
Source: Reproduced from WGI website      
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#reports  
    
Given this backdrop and the set up described before reformatory policy may have 
counterintuitive outcomes with unintended expansion of the informal segment, extortion activity 
etc. The basic results that we derive in this paper are as follows: (i) following reform informal 
workers would be worse off in money terms; (ii) reform amplifies the informal output; (iii) a 
policy of reform is more likely to increase the extortion activity.8  
                                                 
8
 It is also interesting to note that a better quality of administration may bring about more informal production 
though corruptive activity shrinks. The effect of such a change is outlined in Appendix B. Readers are advised to 
check this result only after having a fair idea about the structure of the model that is developed in Section 2. 
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Remaining paper is arranged as follows. Section 2 discusses the basic model and the 
equilibrium. Section 3 deals with the impact of tariff cut on outputs, informal wage, the size of 
the extortion sector and informal good’s price. Section 4 briefly discuses the role of capital 
mobility. The last section concludes the paper. However, the detailed mathematical derivations 
are relegated to the Appendix. 
2.  The Basic Model and Solutions 
There are three goods X, Y and Z produced in the neo-classical framework using four factors 
such as skilled labor (S), unskilled labor (L) and two types of capital (K and T). K is perfectly 
mobile across X and Y but T is specific to Z. The specificity assumption of capital needs a bit of 
qualification. In general credit markets for formal and informal sectors are not identical. Formal 
sector can avail government/legal credit whereas informal units are shunned from accessing this 
market as they are illegal by nature. They have to rely on local money lenders who usually 
charge high return for capital. In addition return to capital in the informal sector is not 
necessarily linked with that of in the formal sector. Hence we assume formal and informal sector 
capital as specific. We will, however, relax this assumption in a later section of the paper. S is 
specific to X and gets Ws as wage. L is mobile between Y and Z.  Unskilled labors (L) are 
unionized in Y. They get   as their wage. K gets identical return r across X and Y while T gets 
R in Z. Who are not fortunate enough to work in Y, have to go out of the formal segment. 
Because of their livelihood they need to find out alternative workplace. This is provided by Z9. 
Producers of Z, however, need to comply with some institutional and political menace as it is an 
extra-legal, if not illegal, activity. To combat such menace producers obtain service of 
                                                 
9
 Z can not be produced by these two factors only. It requires the service of another factor that actually negotiates 
between producers and administrators since Z is not permitted to be produced legally. But if Z is never produced 
some labor must remain unemployed and they will not survive. Therefore Z is a necessity for perfectly competitive 
full employment framework. 
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intermediaries. Intermediaries are unproductive in that no additional output is produced by them. 
Their marginal productivities in terms of the volume of goods are zero though they get positive 
return for their work10. However, without such an arrangement production of Z could not have 
taken place. We call sector Z as informal productive sector. 
We further assume that intermediation is done only by unskilled labor. As we have already 
stated, people engaged in intermediation activities get pecuniary benefit without producing 
goods. Let LN be the people and N be the sector representing intermediation/extortion. The return 
to extortionist, , must be greater than competitive informal wage, W.  The difference between 
PZ and sum of the return to productive factors in Z goes to extortionists as a payment for 
intermediation activities. N people also have to take care of the police personnel who are 
supposed to go for evicting these informal production units as these are illegal from 
government’s perspective. The informal units survive with the probability of being caught in act 
is q and under this condition intermediators need to pay b fraction of WN as bribe. After paying 
out for the police the return to LN must be equal to W since labor is mobile between Z and N. 
Here it is worth mentioning that LN people always receive WN as return irrespective of whether 
administration can identify the informal units or not. Thus here both, a part of administration and 
N people are involved in corrupt practices.  N people pay bribe to police not only for the 
informal production units but also for their own existence. If there are no informal production the 
return to N people goes down to zero. And on the other hand whether Z survives or not that 
crucially depends on how many people are involved in extortion activities or how much is paid 
                                                 
10
 We can coin this sort of intermediations as directly unproductive profit-seeking activities (Bhagwati, 1982). This 
is the concept of corruption and/or related extortion that we are going to use in our model. 
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to these extortionists. Say  is the fraction of the value of informal output that is lost due to 
intermediations or extortion. Precisely speaking  represents the fee of extortion11.  
Here, we have a small open economy with competitive markets for production as well as for 
extortions related intermediation or corruption. Competitive corruption market implies that the 
lost output due to intermediation is fully exhausted in paying out extortionists out of which a part 
(may be fixed or variable) goes to police. Moreover, we have the standard neo-classical 
assumptions of constant returns (CRS) to scale and diminishing return to factors. The following 
set of equations describes the model and the interpretations of symbols are usual and well used in 
trade models (Jones, 1965, 1971)12. Let the prices of X and Y be normalized to unity. Y is the 
importable commodity and subject to protection. Protection of any kind, tariff or tax or subsidy, 
is merely reflected by an increase in the effective price of Y. In case of tariff price goes up 
straightaway as tariff inclusive price of import should be equal to the domestic price. Whereas, if 
we consider a production subsidy (or tax) either effective cost of production goes down (in case 
of production subsidy) or producer gets less than the market price (in case of production tax). A 
reduction in subsidy or an increase in tax acts like removing protection of any sort which is quite 
similar with tariff reform. Hence the implications should be identical with that of tariff-case. 
Therefore a carefully designed subsidy rate or tariff rate or tax rate are in fact indistinguishable 
in nature. Here we consider protection in form of tariff t13.  
                                                 
11
 Here it is advisable not to confuse between “fee” and “wage”: fee means the fraction or the value of per unit of 
output that is lost due to extortion whereas extortionist’s wage is the return to a single extortionist for his service. 
 
12
 The symbols that would be used extensively in this paper are:  ⇒ price of the jth commodity ( j= X, Y, Z); 
 ⇒ 
skilled wage;  ⇒ unskilled formal wage;  ⇒ unskilled informal wage;  ⇒ rate of return to K;  ⇒ rate of 
return to T;  ⇒ production requirement of the ith factor in one unit of jth commodity ( i = S,L,K,T and j = X,Y,Z); S ⇒ total supply of skilled labor; L ⇒ total supply of unskilled labor;  ⇒ number of unskilled labor employed in 
extortion; K ⇒ total supply of capital, K; T ⇒ total supply of capital, T. 
 
13
 One can effortlessly disagree to argue that Y should not be the importable commodity for any developing 
economy as it uses unskilled workers. But we do not find any harm in assuming this. Here skilled good (X) is 
12 
 
Competitive commodity market guarantees the following equalities:  

 
 +   = 1                         (1)                                       
  +   = 1 +                         (2) 
  +   = 1 −                                         (3)  
Note that,  [ ]1,0∈α ; a low α will mean lower fee of extortion and conversely.  
The production function for Z is represented by  
  = ,          (4) 
The expected wage for extortionist satisfies the following equation  
 
1 −    =        (5)  
  The labor mobility between informal production and extortion segments ensures the 
equality in equation (5). This has to hold true. If the LHS (RHS)14 of equation-5 becomes greater 
than RHS (LHS) everyone would find it more worthy to be involved in extortion (production) 
related activities and would eventually result in non-feasibility of both the informal segments. 
The reason is the complementarity between extortionists and productive workers in the informal 
sector. And equation (5) further makes informal workers, essentially, indifferent between 
extortion and production.  
Therefore,  = !"#$ % where 0 <  < 1  and 0 ≤  ≤ 1   (6) 
Equation (6) always ensures that   >  except the extreme case where  = 0. We further, 
sensibly, assume that  >  > . 
                                                                                                                                                             
exportable and Z is non-traded. In order to avoid the possibility of complete specialization we have taken the 
remaining good (Y) as importable. Introduction of any other commodity as importable, instead of Y, would not 
matter much to the basic results of the paper. 
 
14
  LHS = Left Hand Side of the equation, RHS = Right Hand Side of the equation. 
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We have mentioned earlier that N people are paid out of the amount lost from the value of Z. 
And in a competitive set up the value of output lost in Z must be identical to the payment made 
for extortionists. Thus, 
.  .  =         (7) 
Plugging (6) into (7)  
+.,-.,-. = !"#$ %       (8)   
Full employment conditions ensure the following:  

 . / = 0         (9) 
 . / +  . 1 = 2         (10) 
 .  =          (11) 
. 1 +  .  =  −        (12) 
We further assume that the demand for Z follows standard Cobb-Douglas preference where 3 
fraction of consumers’ income is spent on the informal good. Therefore demand-supply 
equilibrium in the informal sector entails 
34/ + 1 +  15 = 1 − 3.        (13)  
This completes the structure of the model. Now let us solve for the unknown variables. Note 
that 4, ,  , 2, , , 05 are exogenously given and we need to solve for  
4
, , , , , /, 1, , 5 from equation (1) - (3) and (8) – (13). We have nine equations and 
nine unknown variables. Thus the system is solvable. Given the tariff rate, we solve for r from 
(2) as   is exogenously determined by workers’ union. Equation (1) would determine Ws for 
already determined r. Thus 
 , , 67  are determined through CRS assumption. 
Hence (9) gives us the value of X and given this value of X we can solve for Y from (10) as 
endowment of S and K are constants. However,  , ,  ,  and  are still to be determined. 
Substituting from (9) and (10) equation (12) can be rewritten as 
14 
 
 +  =  − ;<=;>= ?2 − ;>@;A@ 0B      (14) 
Given the commodity prices we know the values of ,  ,  , 
   and L, K and S are 
given. Thus RHS of (14) is constant. This implies a negative relationship between  and .  
Again equation (8) can also be represented as  
+.,-. = !,- . ""#$ %       (15)  
Here !,- is the real wage of informal workers;   and   are given. Following an increase in 
 the RHS of (15) would fall as the marginal productivity of Lz falls. And simultaneously the 
numerator of the LHS must go up as the supply of variable factor increases. Thus to bring back 
equality in (15)  has to increase. Therefore,  and  are positively related following 
equation (15).  
In what follows we can represent equation (14) and (15) in    and  space (Figure-1) to 
determine the equilibrium values of  ∗  and ∗ . 
Given the equilibrium values of  ∗   and  ∗  one can easily calculate Z from (15) as all the 
remaining variables are given. In fact, the equilibrium value of LN can also be calculated for any 
given value of Lz .  
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           Lz 
         A      D   Equation (15)  
 
         ∗              E  
 
          C          B   Equation (14)  
    
O    ∗      LN 
Figure –1 
Determination of equilibrium  and . 
 
Once Z is determined, the Cobb-Douglas preference function helps in solving. It is 
apparent from (13) that given the values of X and Y, demand for Z coming from the formal 
sector remains constant. Hence, on the one hand, if Pz goes up Z has to fall in the RHS of (13), 
signifying the standard negative relationship. On the other hand an increase in Pz must be 
followed by a rise in the return to informal workers and the specific factor T. The return to 
specific factor would increase more compared to informal labor15. Therefore, producer will try to 
economize on the usage of dearer factor, implying a rise in Z. This explains the positive supply 
side relationship between Pz and Z. This is precisely how, the equilibrium Pz is determined in 
this model. Therefore, given the equilibrium value of Pz, W is determined from (8). And 
eventually using Pz and W we can calculate the value of R. Thus the entire system is solved. 
However, it is worth mentioning that once W is determined, WN  is calculated from (6) without 
any apprehension.  
                                                 
15
 For a detailed mathematical derivation see Appendix A. 
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3.  Effects of Reform 
There is no wonder that restrictive policies are gradually becoming an issue of past. An era of 
reform has set in and the entire developing world in some form or the other has responded to 
such transformation thanks to the negotiations at the WTO. Therefore to start the analysis of 
reform we assume that the government has initiated the liberalization strategy and accordingly 
opted for a tariff cut or reduction in subsidy in the importable sector. Setting D = 0,  we derive  
 ̂ =  ̂. FG>= < 0 and D
 = − G>@GA@ . FG>= . ̂ > 0    (16)16 
Given the values  and  equation (3) gives us 
  D  H + I H = 0       (17) 
Since 
 and r change, the possibility of substitution of factors of production arises. Applying 
the elasticity of substitution we obtain17 
   
/I = −J. G>@GA@ . FG>= . ̂   > 0 ;  as ̂ < 0
1I = J. G>@GA@ . M>@M>= . FG>= . ̂  < 0 ;  as ̂ < 0N = −J. HOD − IP QR
S
RT
  (18) 
In the following segments as and when required we shall discuss the economic arguments behind 
such results derived above. This would keep us away from repetitive discussions. 
3.A  Informal Wage and Informal Output 
Using the full employment condition of unskilled labor and plugging the value of change in 
the number of extortionists from equation (8) we have 
                                                 
16
 Note that throughout the paper a circumflex over a variable represents proportional change; Hs signify the 
distributive share of a factor in a particular good or service e.g. H=!;<-,- , H=U;V-,-  and so on; and Ws imply 
employment share of factor in any commodity such as W = ;<-   etc. 
 
17
 Elasticity of substitution for X, Y and Z are represented, respectively, by J = ;X>@#;XA@!D A#Ŷ  , J = ;X>=#;X<=!D #Ŷ  and J = ;XV-#;X<-!D #UI . 
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N = − Z− M<.M<-  D − M<.M<-  J. HOD − IP + J. M<=M<- .  G>@GA@ . M>@M>= . FG>= . ̂[     (19) 
Equation (17), (18) and (19) together help deriving the values of  D  and I as follows:  
D = M<-.M<=.\@.]>@]A@ .^>@^>= . _]>=.FN.∆.]V-^<."a∆.GV-
I = − G<-GV-
M<-.M<=.\@.]>@]A@ .^>@^>= . _]>=.FN.∆.]V-^<."a∆.GV- QR
S
RT  where,  ∆=  M<.M<-aM<.     (20) 
It is evident from (20) that D < 0 as t falls. Therefore, I > 0 since there is no change in the 
price of informal good and extortion-fee. Any benefit of informal capital has to be offset by 
tantamount loss to other complementary factor. Hence, OD − IP < 0. This inequality guarantees 
an increase in Z. Therefore, 
Proposition I: Consequent upon reform: 
(a)  Informal wage and return to extortionists would fall; 
(b) Informal output will increase.  
Economic argument behind this outcome is very easy to follow. Due to liberalization, as Y 
shrinks, the supply of unskilled labor increases in the informal sector. This depresses W as the 
supply of complementary factor, T is fixed. The fixity of T causes a decrease in the marginal 
productivity of labor in informal sector. This corroborates our claim on informal wage. 
Extortionists’ return also goes down because  and  are positively related with the condition 
that  > . The exact relation is defined in (6). Again, notice that, when W falls, R must 
increase. This induces  to decline implying factor substitution in Z. A decrease in per unit 
requirement of T in Z ensures unambiguous expansion of Z, informal output.  ∎ 
3.B  Number of Extortionists 
In this subsection we focus on a striking issue of this paper – number of extortionists. 
Extortion activity N shares informal workers with Z. Z shares unskilled workers with Y, and 
again Y shares K with X. Notice that same unskilled workers can work as either formal labor or 
18 
 
informal labor or extortionist. This inter-linkage forces us to look at all the issues 
simultaneously.  
Results for X and Y (recall equation (18)) are quite obvious as both X and Y share same 
mobile capital, K. As Y shrinks some unskilled labor would be released. They would 
immediately rush to the informal fragment. Therefore, informal activity must expand. Note that 
informal activity consists of both production and extortion. This implies an unequivocal increase 
in (LN+LZ). Whether output of Z would spread out that depends on as to where these relinquished 
labors get employed: in production (Lz) or in extortion related intermediation (LN) or in both. 
Thus the interesting question is what happens to LN and Lz separately.  
Proposition II: LN will increase due to reform if unskilled labor using formal sector’s share 
of expenditure on informal good is not insignificant. 
Proof: From equation (14) the RHS must increase as labor employed in Y dwindles and 
simultaneously the LHS has to go up. This is portrayed in figure-2. It is evident from the diagram 
that Lz will increase coupled with an increase in LN. Hence output of Z should rise as T remains 
fixed at an exogenously given level. 
Yet there are some other possibilities regarding  and  .  Keep Lz fixed by 
assumption. This will ensure an increase in LN. In figure-2 CD has to shift right along with an 
upward shift of AB. Thus the prime point of concern is, as a consequence of such assumption  
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Determination of equilibrium  and  due to a fall in t  
 
how much likely that Lz will remain unchanged. Lz would stay unaffected if “in equilibrium” Z 
remains impervious. From the Cobb-Douglas preference it is apparent that (a) as Y falls demand 
for Z should fall; (b) as X increases demand for Z should rise; and (c) demand for Z also rises 
because of an increase in LN (note that to start with Lz is kept frozen). “In equilibrium” if (a) is 
offset by the (b) and (c), informal production does not change and hence an unchanged Lz. This 
underwrites an unconditional expansion of LN as total amount of informal labor has already risen. 
However, if (a) is strong enough Lz must fall and if positive demand effect is sufficiently strong 
both LN and LZ are likely to expand. This state has been described in figure-2. Therefore it is 
more likely that LN or extortion activity will increase due to reform. 
Mathematically, from (8) 
 I = N − D = −J . HOD − IP − D       (21) 
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Simple manipulation delineates  I = −D Z\-.G<-G<-#GV-GV- − 1[  (22) 
Equation (21) is relatively easy to explain the outcome. D  itself is negative  and OD − IP is also 
negative. Thus, I has to be positive. Careful investigation explores that and positive I has a 
tendency to increase Z and to reduce LN . This is precisely why we had different possibilities in 
theoretical explanation.        ∎ 
3.C  Informal Price 
 What happens to the informal price consequent upon a reformatory policy that is not very 
undemanding as liberalization conventionally raises the formal income18. The increased income 
induces higher demand for informal good, the supply of which has already been raised. In what 
follows the eventual impact on Pz relies on the relative strength of these two effects.   
Differentiating and manipulating equation (13) we get 
I = −0J G>@GA@ FG>= ̂ + 0J G>@GA@ M>@M>= FG>= 1 + ̂ + 0̂ + J G<-GV- 
M<-.M<=.\@.]>@]A@ .^>@^>= . _]>=.∆.]V-^<."a∆.GV- . ̂   
             (23) 
    where, 0 = c."#c.,-. ; 0 = c."#c.,-.   
Proposition III: Following reform informal price would fall if W > W. 
Proof: A closer look at (23) reveals that if 0 is sufficiently large than 0  , it is more likely that 
0J G>@GA@ M>@M>= FG>= ̂ > 0J G>@GA@ FG>= ̂  ⇒ 0 W > 0  W . Even if 0 and 0 are identical, the 
inequality holds true if M>@ M>= > 1 ⇒ W >  W  ⇒ W
 <  W . In this situation all the remaining 
values are negative. This confirms that  must fall.       
                                                 
18
 One special case under this situation could be the unchanged income from X and Y together. It is not impossible 
possible as X goes up and Y falls in tandem. 
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Benefitted workers’ share is less in X. These people are not likely to spend much on Z as 
0 < 0 (assumed). Despite that there would be some positive demand effect for Z as X expands 
and a small fraction of increased income will be directed towards informal good. On the other 
hand whose expenditure share on Z is much higher that shrinks indicating a negative demand 
effect. On top of this, a positive demand effect is also generated through an increase in LN. 
Coupled with this supply of Z goes up which has a tendency to push down . Therefore, it is 
more likely that informal price should fall owing to reform.     ∎ 
4. Capital Mobility between Formal and Informal Sector   
In the basic model we have not allowed the capital to move from formal to informal sector 
since informal producers did not have access to legal credit market. This, essentially, acted as a 
restraint for capital mobility between formal and informal sector. If we relax this assumption and 
allow both formal and informal producers to get hold of required capital from same market, we 
can imbibe the essence of capital mobility in the structure that we have developed before. 
Allowing capital mobility simplifies the structure and solution of the model a bit. Under this 
condition the formal sector represents the standard specific factor model whereas sector Y and Z 
in concert resembles the Heckscher-Ohlin (HO) structure. Therefore the output effects and the 
change in factors’ return crucially depend on the factor intensity comparison between Y and Z.  
The initiation of liberalization policy forces a fall in the return to capital which is perfectly 
mobile across all sectors. So capital also gets relatively less return in informal sector. This 
promises an increase in informal wage, W. Extortionists’ income will increase as well. Note that 
return to skilled workers must go up. Factor substitution follows in both skilled formal sector and 
informal sector. Skilled formal output increases. This draws capital from other sectors. Capital 
from both unskilled formal and informal sectors has equal probability to move to X. In what 
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follows whether Y or Z will expand that depends on factor intensity assumption. Formal sector is 
traditionally capital intensive than informal one. Thus Y contracts and Z expands. As Y 
contracts, some unskilled labors are released and instantaneously rush to either Z or N. Z spreads 
out with immediate effect. This also calls for an increase in LN. However, increased W influences 
LN otherwise (see equation (7) for any given Pz) therefore, eventual effect is uncertain. Here 
introduction of capital mobility completely reverses the effect on informal wage though LN is 
indeterminate 
 5. Concluding Remarks   
In this paper our endeavor is to propose an apt extension of HOS framework where both formal 
and informal sectors work in tandem. Formal goods are produced in the fair segment of the 
economy while informal sector is affected by extortion. But informal good is never unwarranted. 
Under these circumstances a policy of reform leads to: a fall in informal wage and return to 
extortionists; informal output rises; number of extortionists in economy is more likely to go up. 
However, if we allow capital to move between formal and informal sectors, informal wage 
would escalate. 
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APPENDIX  A 
Given all other variables except Pz, differentiating equation (3) and using the standard 
notations for general equilibrium trade model we get 
D  H + I H  = I1 −       (A.1) 
Note that, nothing would happen to X and Y as D =  D
 =  ̂ =  ̂ = 0. Factor substitution is 
not permitted due to non-changing factor prices and in addition to this, unchanged factor supply 
confirms constancy of X and Y. 
Mathematically, using the elasticity of substitution for Z one gets the value of change in Z as 
N = −J . HOD − IP        (A.2) 
Assume no change in L. From the full employment condition of unskilled labor  
  N = −I M<.M<-           (A.3) 
Plug I  from (8) and modify equation (A.3) 
N = −  M<.M<-  OI +  D − D P         (A.4) 
Comparing (A.2) and (A.4) and then manipulating a bit 
D = I Z1 − +.\-.G<-\-.G<-a∆.GV-[        (A.5) 
 
Here,  ∆=  M<.M<-aM<.      and  0 <  < 1. Hence D  is unambiguously positive if I > 0 and 
J. H + ∆. H >  . J. H.  
Equation (A.5) asserts that OD − IP = −I ? +.\-.G<-\-.G<-a∆.GV-B    (A.6) 
Therefore, for I > 0, OD − IP < 0  Or,  D < I      (A.7) 
Equation (A.7) coupled with the argument of (A.1) ensures a positive I and I > D . 
Therefore, OD − IP < 0 which indicates a positive N  due to an increase in Pz through equation 
(A.2). 
APPENDIX  B 
An increase in monitoring or bq 
An improvement in the quality of administration (may be due to an 
institutional/administrative reform) in presence of kleptocracy is straightway reflected by an 
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increase in monitoring /auditing probability of identifying the people who defy laws. Here the 
law breakers are informal units. Therefore a better administration would be followed by an 
increase in  .  
Differentiating the price equation of Z 
D  H + I H  = 0        (B.1) 
Output of X and Y would not change as D =  
d =  ̂ =  ̂ = 0.  
From the full employment condition of labor and substituting (8)  
N = −  M<.M<-  ?O1 −  dP +  D − D B        (B.2) 
Simple mathematical manipulation yields 
D = ∆.O"#$%d P∆. GV- a  \-.G<-        (B.3) 
Therefore, D  is unambiguously negative as O1 −  dP < 0. In that case I > 0. This is obvious 
from equation (B.1). This guarantees OD − IP < 0 which in turn makes sure that  N >
0. Basically this takes place through relocating adjustments of Lz and LN. Here Lz increases and 
LN falls.  
The exact value of I is denoted by 
I = −O1 −  dP Z1 − ∆ ∆. GV- a  \-.G<-[      (B.4)  
We have already argued that I > 0, which implies an automatic and obvious satisfaction of 
the inequality:  ∆ ∆. GV- a  \-.G<- < 1. Under this circumstance the effect on Pz is straight and 
simple. It must decrease as supply goes up without changing the demand. However, for a given T 
an increase in Lz ensures a decline in real wage of informal workers. Nevertheless, what happens 
to the money or real wage of extortionists that is not yet clear. From equation (6) we get, 
 D = D − O1 −  dP        
In the RHS of the above equation, W has already fallen and 1 −  e   is also negative. Thus WN 
would decrease if W falls at a rate faster than (1-bq). Accordingly, extortionists are relatively 
less worse-off than informal workers, if they lose at all. Symbolically, 
  D ≶ 0 iff iD i ≷ iO1 −  dPi       (B.5) 
However, when monitoring probability increases, except WN all factors’ return would remain 
unaffected if we allow for capital mobility across all sectors. WN goes up. LN must fall and hence 
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LZ and Z would increase. The increase in Z would squeeze Y because of Heckscher-Ohlin 
structure.  
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